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Abstract: Hovering over the peace negotiations in progress in former Yugoslavia is the international 
community's determination to bring to trial as war criminals those political and military leaders responsible 
for atrocities in Bosnia. The question clearly presented is that, however desirable the idea of war crimes 
accountability might appear in the abstract, pursuing the goal of a war crimes tribunal may simply result in 
prolonging a war of civilian atrocities. Is it not conceivable that, in return for securing a peace treaty, the 
UN officials may have extended some assurance to the leaders in former Yugoslavia that, one way or 
another, war crimes trials will not take place? 
 
Tags:  Bosnia, War Crimes Tribunal (former Yugoslavia), War Criminals 
 
[pg500]** Peace negotiations, amid continued hostilities, are in progress in former 
Yugoslavia at the time of this writing. Hovering over the negotiations is the international 
community's determination to bring to trial as war criminals those political and military 
leaders responsible for atrocities in Bosnia, including rape [FN1] and "ethnic cleansing." 
The United Nations rapporteur for the establishment of the Yugoslav war crimes tribunal, 
M. Cherif Bassiouni, has articulated on numerous occasions the international 
community's determination to prosecute war criminals on all sides of the three-cornered 
war in Bosnia. However, some of the Serbian, Muslim and Croatian political and military 
leaders who are potential targets of the tribunal are participating in the peace 
negotiations. Is it realistic to expect them to agree to a peace settlement in Bosnia if, 
directly following the agreement, they may find themselves in the dock? If they, or their 
close associates and friends, face potential life imprisonment by simply signing a peace 
treaty, what incentive do they have to sign it? 
 
Sometimes international scholars have to proceed by inferring negotiations in the 
absence of an evidentiary record. How are we to know whether some United Nations 
officials, in their numerous and usually unrecorded meetings with Serbian, Muslim and 
Croatian leaders, may have privately acknowledged that it is unrealistic to expect a peace 
treaty in light of subsequent prosecutions for war crimes? Is it not at least conceivable 
that, in return for securing a peace treaty, the UN officials may have extended some form 
of assurance to the leaders in former Yugoslavia that, one way or another, the war crimes 
trials will not take place? 
 
If such assurances are being proffered in the Bosnian negotiations, they would of 
necessity have to be highly secret. World public opinion might not tolerate the idea of 
war criminals' being able to bargain their way out of prosecution for their crimes. Further 
complicating the issue is the fact that the United Nations officials engaged in the 
negotiations for peace in former Yugoslavia do not themselves have the authority to 
waive the right of the United Nations to prosecute war criminals. That right seems firmly 
established in the Security Council under chapter VII of the UN Charter.[FN2] Only the 
Council itself could trade its right to prosecute war criminals in former Yugoslavia in 
return for a final peace settlement in that troubled region. But even at the level of the 
Security Council, any such deal would probably have to be hidden under a veil of 
diplomatic secrecy, since the deal would presumably be severely criticized in the world 
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media. Yet the incentive for the Security Council to countenance such a deal is strong. 
For it may be justified on the ground that it is better to stop the bloodshed of innocent 
civilians in former Yugoslavia than to insist on punishing war criminals. Securing peace 
in Bosnia may seem to the UN officials to be preferable to achieving individual 
accountability for war crimes. In broad but perhaps misleading terms, peace may here 
seem more important than justice. 
 
There is scant historical precedent for the apparently novel dilemma of attempting to 
achieve a peace treaty when some of the negotiators themselves are in [pg501] jeopardy 
of being prosecuted as war criminals. Is there any lesson to be derived from the 
successful establishment of the Nuremberg and Far East Tribunals following the Second 
World War? The Allies had insisted upon "unconditional surrender," an insistence that in 
retrospect may have unnecessarily prolonged the war by giving little, if any, incentive to 
Axis political and military leaders to sue for peace. In Europe there were no peace 
negotiations; the war ended when Hitler was killed and most of the Nazi leaders were 
captured. Following the German capitulation, various "peace feelers" issued from Tokyo, 
but again there were no formal peace negotiations. The Allies seemed to reject the idea of 
peace negotiations as inconsistent with unconditional surrender. After the horror of the 
atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, peace was rapidly negotiated and the 
idea of totally unconditional surrender was finally dropped, at least insofar as Japan was 
allowed to keep its emperor. Overall, there was little, if any, opportunity either in Europe 
or in the Far East for any of the Axis leaders to attempt to place the matter of war crimes 
tribunals on the bargaining table. Moreover, it is not clear how many of the remaining 
leaders were aware of the Allies' determination to proceed with postwar criminal 
accountability. Indeed, the Allies themselves were not of one mind on this subject; there 
was considerable debate regarding the desirability of the Nuremberg Tribunal in the 
United States, and the Soviet Union was opposed to the idea. 
 
In the aftermath of Nuremberg, the very real possibility of individual responsibility 
for war crimes, coupled with the fact that there has been no "unconditional surrender" 
war since 1945, may account for the conspicuous absence of international tribunals 
following the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the wars involving Israel, and other 
international conflicts. During the Persian Gulf war, the idea of holding trials of Iraqi 
political and military leaders was raised and debated in Congress, [FN3] but nothing 
eventually came of it. Here the United Nations forces certainly had it within their power 
to set up such a tribunal, and many of the Iraqi military leaders were in captivity. It may 
be a long time before we get documentary evidence on who decided to drop the idea of 
prosecuting the Iraqi war criminals. Perhaps some American military leaders feared their 
own prosecution for inaccuracy in the bombing of Baghdad, and thus there was little 
incentive to pursue the idea of a war crimes tribunal. But whatever the reasons, the failure 
of the international community to set up such a war crimes tribunal, when it had the 
means and ability to do so, must be counted as a significant negative precedent for 
international accountability. 
 
The conditions in Bosnia are even less favorable for a war crimes tribunal than they 
were after the Persian Gulf war. Unlike the Iraqi military leaders responsible for war 
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crimes in Kuwait, the persons allegedly responsible for war crimes in Bosnia are still at 
large and indeed are present—or their friends are present—at the peace negotiations. 
 
Nor is there any element of surprise, as there may have been at Nuremberg. The idea 
of international war crimes accountability is surely conspicuous to the political and 
military leaders currently negotiating for peace in former Yugoslavia. It is only human to 
expect them to insist privately on immunity as a condition for peace. It is possible that the 
United Nations has sent a signal to the leaders in former Yugoslavia that the war crimes 
tribunal might fail for lack of funding. For [pg502] the United Nations has so far 
allocated only a small fraction of the costs of the tribunal. Even so, using the budget to 
undercut a program in place is a shaky proposition (although governments are quite adept 
at doing such things internally). Professor Bassiouni has had some success in obtaining 
private donations to fund his extensive computerized compilation of evidence of war 
crimes. Who is to say that private donors might not come forth to pay the costs of the war 
crimes tribunal even if the United Nations would prefer to let the idea die for lack of 
funding? 
 
But none of these financial considerations go to the heart of the policy dilemma 
facing the international community. The question clearly presented is that, however 
desirable the idea of war crimes accountability might appear in the abstract, pursuing the 
goal of a war crimes tribunal may simply result in prolonging a war of civilian atrocities. 
This would surely be a paradoxical result, for the idea of war crimes accountability is to 
deter the commission of war crimes and not to serve as a barrier to discontinuing them. 
 
Let us examine more closely the precise interest in securing individual accountability 
for war crimes. Consider the analogous case of settlement discussions in a complex 
domestic tort litigation. Courts strongly encourage parties to settle their case on their own 
terms. Rarely is there judicial interference with the terms of the settlement, an exception 
being the occasional supervision of attorneys' fees in class action settlements. The reason 
for judicial abstention, even in cases of product liability resulting in wrongful death, is 
that judges feel that the parties can achieve exact justice in their private negotiations. 
Judges do not believe that there is any component of "social justice" that has to be 
inserted into the settlement negotiations by the court. Indeed, the prevailing judicial 
attitude that the parties can achieve exact justice among themselves is so strong that 
courts typically will allow the parties, if it is one of the settlement conditions, to conceal 
the terms of the settlement. 
 
Applying the domestic tort model to the Bosnian peace process might lead us to 
conclude that the warring parties can achieve perfect justice among themselves, and that 
there should be no real independent international interest in the matter. Surely the parties 
are aware of the war crimes and atrocities that were committed during the course of the 
war. Surely they can make adjustments in the terms of the peace treaty as compensation 
for these crimes. If an impending Yugoslav war crimes tribunal in their view constitutes 
an impediment to a peace settlement (because of the negotiators' personal fear of 
indictment), then a settlement to achieve justice inter se would be subverted by their fear 




But is domestic tort litigation the appropriate model? Suppose A murders B, and B's 
heirs sue A in tort. Suppose further that A is wealthy, and offers B's heirs ten million 
dollars in damages. B's heirs regard this as a generous offer, and they accept it. Yet if A 
insists, as part of the settlement, that his prosecution for murder must be dropped, B's 
heirs will correctly reply that, although they may be willing to bargain away the criminal 
prosecution, they have no power to do so. In other words, there is a state interest in 
prosecuting the murderer above and beyond the victim's interest in full compensation. 
 
The state's interest is largely summed up in the term "deterrence." Deterrence is an 
interest that is logically independent of the interests of A and B. As A, the murderer, 
obviously was not deterred, punishing him has no deterrent effect upon him; the purpose 
of punishing him is solely to provide an example to others. B, the victim, is similarly 
unaffected by deterrence; obviously his murder was not [pg503] deterred. Applying this 
reasoning to the Bosnian situation, it may well be that, although the parties can secure 
perfect justice among themselves in their private peace negotiations, an international 
interest exists that is above and beyond the interests of the parties. The international 
interest consists of deterring would-be war criminals. This interest may be quite 
irrelevant to the victims of the atrocities in Bosnia, but it is forward-looking in its attempt 
to deter similar atrocities in future conflicts. 
 
This line of reasoning seems to take us further into a dilemma. If we posit an 
international interest in deterrence that is above and beyond the interests of the parties in 
the peace negotiations, we face the problem that the leaders of former Yugoslavia may 
simply refuse to sign a treaty of peace that will jeopardize them personally. Even if they 
accept the logic of deterring future war criminals, they still can be presumed to be driven 
primarily by the practical motive of self-preservation. But the dilemma deepens because 
the international community cannot exempt specific individuals from war crimes 
prosecution on the ground that they were either present at the peace negotiations or had 
political clout with the negotiators. It would simply be unacceptable to immunize leaders 
while prosecuting their subordinates for war crimes. For if immunity were given to the 
leaders, their subordinates would at trial claim superior orders in mitigation of their 
offense. To prove their claim, the defendants would offer evidence of orders issued by the 
very people who have immunity. Those people would be called as witnesses, and the 
world would be treated to a repeated spectacle of witnesses shown to be more culpable 
than the accused. Such a trial might be considerably worse than having no trial at all. 
 
It is difficult to see a practical way out of the dilemma. However, a theoretical 
solution is conceivable. It is one that might excite interest among law-and-economics 
scholars who regard everything in life as having a monetary price. The solution is as 
follows: the United Nations would tell the warring parties to the Bosnian conflict that the 
international war crimes tribunal will proceed unless the Muslims, Croats and Serbs agree 
inter se in their peace negotiations to ask the United Nations to dissolve the tribunal—a 
request that the Security Council will grant. By thus delegating the decision on war 
crimes prosecution to the antagonists themselves, the United Nations would have put the 




Many readers may find this solution distasteful, as I do. Yet it deserves impartial 
analysis. First, offering the tribunal as a bargaining chip would remove the practical 
impediment to peace, for it is only natural to assume that the leaders in former 
Yugoslavia can be expected to arrive at a peace treaty if they do not personally face 
subsequent prosecution as war criminals. Second, offering the tribunal as a bargaining 
chip may achieve most of the deterrence objectives that we previously postulated as an 
independent interest of the international community. 
 
To illustrate this second point, let us assume that the parties agree among themselves 
that each was responsible for one-third of the war crimes and that each was the victim of 
one-third of the war crimes. They might then agree as part of the peace treaty that there 
should be no war crimes tribunal. Because each of them suffered equally from the 
commission of war crimes that they equally perpetrated, the suffering they sustained was 
in effect a punishment that fit their crimes. 
 
Of course, it is unlikely that responsibility and suffering would be apportioned so 
equally. It is more likely that one of the parties committed more war crimes than the 
others, and that the others therefore suffered disproportionately more [pg504] than the 
first party. In that case, the first party would have a greater interest than the other two 
parties in eliminating a war crimes tribunal. Because the first party has this greater 
interest, the other two parties ipso facto gain a bargaining advantage. For the two 
victimized parties will argue in the peace negotiations that, although they would be 
jeopardized to some extent as perpetrators if indicted by a war crimes tribunal, the first 
party would be in far greater jeopardy. Hence, the first party has more to lose than they 
do. The victimized parties would probably add that a war crimes tribunal is necessary to 
redress the imbalance and thus avenge the greater suffering of their own people. In short, 
the bargaining chip has become an asset of the two victimized parties. For the first party 
to secure their agreement to the elimination of the war crimes tribunal as part of an 
overall peace settlement, the first party would have to give up some other asset in 
exchange. That asset could very well be a portion of the disputed Bosnian territory 
currently in the control of the first party. 
 
Here we see how the international interest has been folded into the peace 
negotiations. The international interest consists of deterring future war criminals. This 
deterrence can theoretically be secured by making the tribunal a bargaining chip. If the 
first party has to give up land to get the other two parties to agree to the elimination of the 
war crimes tribunal, that concession becomes a very real cost that the first party incurred 
for its commission of war crimes. Political and military leaders in future wars would thus 
be subject to a double-barreled uncertainty: their own possible prosecution as war 
criminals in the event that the peace process does not result in an agreement to eliminate 
the war crimes tribunal, or possible loss of valued territory so as to obtain agreement 
during the peace negotiations to eliminate the tribunal. 
 
What appears distasteful about this theoretical solution is perhaps best illustrated by a 
return to the domestic law analogy. If B's heirs were permitted to bargain away the state's 
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right to prosecute A, presumably A would pay a higher amount in damages to secure their 
waiver of criminal charges. But domestic law retains its independent right to proceed 
criminally against A, on the general principle that there is a societal interest in deterrence 
that is not necessarily included within the calculus of the victim's interest. Yet arguably, 
if the state's interest is one of deterrence, an economic analysis could work here as well. 
The higher price that A would have to pay to B's heirs to get their waiver of prosecution 
should operate to deter future As just as much as imprisonment of A would deter future 
As. The deterrence would be equal because the amount of money that A pays to B's heirs 
will be equal (in theory at least) to the value to A to avoid being imprisoned. A future 
person in A's position would thus be deterred either by imprisonment or by its equivalent 
value in dollars. Why, then, does domestic law not allow victims to bargain away the 
state's right to prosecute? 
 
One important reason may be the empirical fact that most criminals lack sufficient 
assets to compensate their victims. Although we can imagine that a criminal who has ten 
million dollars would be deterred by the prospect of having to pay his victim ten million 
dollars, the criminal who has only ten dollars would not be deterred by the prospect of 
having to pay his victim ten million dollars. Nor could the criminal justice system operate 
on two tracks: imprisoning the impecunious criminals while allowing the wealthy 
criminals to buy their way out of jail. But if all criminals had sufficient assets to 
compensate their victims—a most unlikely prospect—then perhaps society would opt for 
a system of victims' bargaining away the state's right to prosecute. (Something like this 
bargaining principle for criminal [pg505] delicts obtained among the patricians under 
ancient Roman law—each person in that class had sufficient assets to be deterred by the 
threat of having to pay full compensation.) It is arguable today that a compensatory 
system would do a lot more for the victims of crime than putting the criminal in jail 
where he does no good to the victims and burdens society (including the victims as 
taxpayers) with the costs of incarceration. 
 
Although it is most unlikely for a domestic system ever to consist of citizens who 
each have that degree of wealth, in international peace negotiations the opposite is true. 
All parties to the peace negotiations have assets that the other side desires. This statement 
is a truism, for the very existence of a war betokens the fact that both sides of the conflict 
have assets that the warring parties are trying to acquire by force. These assets, then, 
constitute bargaining chips in the peace negotiations. 
 
We now see the critical importance for the international community to mount a 
credible threat of war crimes prosecutions. The peace negotiators must have a realistic 
fear of being prosecuted if the war crimes tribunal is to become a credible bargaining 
chip. If there were no impending possibility of prosecution, the party that committed a 
disproportionate amount of the war crimes would simply have no incentive to give away 
any land or any other assets for any reason connected to the commission of war crimes. 
 
I am not advocating the "bargaining chip" approach to the Yugoslav war crimes 
tribunal so much as trying to understand the possibility that something like this process, 
hidden from our notice, may be happening at present. If the United Nations is 
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downplaying the tribunal (for example, by giving it only trivial financial support), it may 
be actuated by a diplomatic insight that insisting upon a tribunal has the practical effect 
of prolonging the war. But if in fact the United Nations is (secretly) prepared to abandon 
the war crimes tribunal in order to catalyze peace in the Balkans, the process may not 
have been fully thought through. How indeed could the tribunal be abandoned? Simply 
cutting off its funding, as I suggested above, might not do it. And what about the 
difficulty of persuading world public opinion, which at present is clearly in favor of 
proceeding to the prosecution of war criminals? How can the Security Council's approval 
be sought in the glare of world publicity? These considerations feed into the main 
dilemma like tributaries feeding into a river; the result may be a muddying of the waters. 
Some United Nations officials may be proceeding under the assumption that the tribunal 
cannot be negotiated away, while others may be in the process of giving it away without 
getting anything in return. This possible lack of institutional clarity could itself result in 
an unnecessary prolongation of the brutal war in Bosnia. 
 
I suggest that there may be something to gain if the Security Council would explicitly 
agree to eliminate the tribunal on the condition that the Muslims, Croats and Serbs sign a 
comprehensive peace treaty for former Yugoslavia. The party committing more war 
crimes would have to make land concessions to the other parties, but no individual 
signatory would face prosecution. This may be the simplest and most direct route to 
peace in the Balkans. 
 
There is one rather neat theoretical payoff in this economic approach to war crimes 
tribunals. The approach, as we have seen, takes an externality—namely, the international 
community's interest in prosecuting war criminals—and internalizes it into the peace 
negotiation process by allowing it to be used as a bargaining chip. In effect, this 
transforms a war crime into a cost of war. A commander who commits a war crime 
during a war incurs a cost so as to obtain immunity from subsequent prosecution—a cost 
consisting of giving up some of the assets that the [pg506] war itself was designed to 
acquire. In this fashion a war crime loses its military justification. Whatever advantages it 
might have had, such as the alleged advantage of terrorizing the opposing side, are 
forfeited where it counts—in the final reckoning of the peace settlement. We therefore 
see a vindication of the classic theory of war crimes—that they are not justified by 
military necessity. By internalizing the costs of the commission of war crimes, 
international law will be able to bring to a successful conclusion the theory that war 
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[FN1]. See Theodor Meron, Rape as a Crime under International Humanitarian Law, 87 




[FN2]. See Paul Szasz, The Proposed War Crimes Tribunal for Ex-Yugoslavia, 25 N.Y.U. 
J. INT'L L. & POL. 405 (1993); see generally Theodor Meron, War Crimes in Yugoslavia 
and the Development of International Law, 88 AJIL 78 (1994). 
 
[FN3]. I testified in April 1991 before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in favor 
of the establishment of a war crimes tribunal. 
 
